Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. v. Al Bench, as Fire Marshall and Fire Chief of the Rockville-Springdale Fire Protection District : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. v. Al Bench, as Fire
Marshall and Fire Chief of the Rockville-Springdale
Fire Protection District : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Terry R. West; Attorney for Appellant.
Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.; Stirba and Hathaway; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Indian Village Trading Post v. Bench, No. 960024 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/19
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CK7TF 
UTA'-' 
DOC J, c,<r 
KFU 
50 
DOCKET NQ - i ( o O Q M - ^ T VCase N6!v960024=C7t 
Priority No. 15 
INDIAN VILLAGE TRADING POST, 
INC. 
Petitioner/Appellant 
v. 
AL BENCH, as Fire Marshall and Fire 
Chief of the Rockville-Springdale Fire 
Protection District, 
Respondent/Appellee 
Cross-Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
CROSS-APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS, AUGUST 30,1995. APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER 
IN CASE ENTERED DECEMBER 12,1995 OF THE DISTRICT 
OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR., (Bar No. 4219) 
STD1BA & HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)364-8300 
FILED 
MAY 9 199S 
°OURT OF A 
PPBALS 
TERRY WEST (Bar No. 4770) 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
P.O. Box 450 
Springdale, Utah 84767 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
INDIAN VILLAGE TRADING POST, 
INC. 
Petitioner/Appellant 
v. 
AL BENCH, as Fire Marshall and Fire 
Chief of the Rockville-Springdale Fire 
Protection District, 
Respondent/Appellee 
Cross-Appellant 
Case No. 960024-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRffiF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
CROSS-APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS, AUGUST 30,1995. APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER 
IN CASE ENTERED DECEMBER 12,1995 OF THE DISTRICT 
OF THE FD7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR., (Bar No. 4219) 
STDIBA & HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)364-8300 
TERRY WEST (Bar No. 4770) 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
P.O. Box 450 
Springdale, Utah 84767 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
FEDERAL CASES v 
STATE CASES v 
RULES vi 
STATUTES vii 
OTHER vii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 1 
L ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 1 
D. ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
L STANDARD OF REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL 2 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
CROSS-APPEAL 7 
PETITIONER'S APPEAL 9 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. CROSS-APPEAL 11 
A. THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND AS 
SUCH, THIS CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED 11 
ii 
B. INDIAN VILLAGE HAD ANOTHER PLAIN, ADEQUATE AND 
SPEEDY REMEDY 13 
C. AL BENCH IS NOT AN INFERIOR COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCY OR OFFICER EXERCISING JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. . 15 
1. Failure to perform an act required by law 15 
2. Al Bench is neither an inferior court nor an officer exercising 
judicial functions 16 
3. Administrative agency 17 
D. THE REVIEW SOUGHT BY PETITIONER WAS NOT WITHIN 
THE SCOPE CONTEMPLATED BY RULE 65B 17 
H. ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF 20 
A. UNDER THE UNIFORM FIRE CODE, THE FIRE CHIEF IS 
GIVEN BROAD DISCRETION IN ADMINISTERING AND 
ENFORCING THE CODE 20 
B. THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY THEN FIRE CHIEF, AL 
BENCH, WAS RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE AND THEREFORE 
SUPPORTED HIS FINDINGS, AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE 
COURT'S, THAT INDIAN VILLAGE TRADING POST, INC.'S 
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM WAS INADEQUATE 23 
1. Trial Court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous 23 
2. Evidence relied on by Al Bench and presented to the Court. . 24 
i. Placement of the hydrants 24 
ii. Flow Tests 26 
iii. Appeals Boards 32 
iv. Solutions offered by then Chief Bench in his December 
10, 1991 letter to Petitioner to make its system safe. . 34 
v. Two hydrants on a six-inch, dead-end line created a 
fire hazard to fire fighters and if used simultaneously, 
would not provide adequate protection 35 
vi. Cavitation and collapse of the system 40 
iii 
C. PETITIONER FAILS TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD FRAUD, NOR 
IS IT A REQUIRED ELEMENT TNT AN ARTTSF OF DTSPRFTTON 
ANALYSIS 
D. THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THEN CHIEF BENCH AND 
THE LOWER COURT SUPPORT BOTH THEIR FINDINGS. . . . 
E. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING CERTAIN 
PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER. 
1. Standard employed by the courts in determining e 
admissibility of evidence 
2. Evidence excluded by the Court 
i. ;. Rosenberg 
ii. Exclusion of reference to statements made at Fire 
Board meeting 
F. THIS COURT SHOULD IGNORE ISSUES RAISED BY 
PETITIONER FOR REVIEW IN ITS AMENDED DOCKETING 
STATEMENT THAT ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN ITS 
ARGUMENT 
(UNCI UNION 
ADDENDA 
A. RELEVANT PORTIONS OF REPORTER'S HEARING TRANSCRIPT OF JULY 
14, 1995 HEARING 
B. RELEVANT PORTIONS OF UNIFORM FIRE CODE (1988) 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Chavez v. Sandia Corp., 555 P.2d 699 (N.M. 1976) 42 
Salem v. U.S. Lines, Co., 370 U.S. 31 (1962) 45 
STATE CASES 
Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992) 2 
Ambus v. State Board of Education, 858 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1993) 16 
Anderson v. Baker, 296 P.2d 283 (Utah 1956) 15, 19 
Bennion v. Sundance Development Corporation, 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995) 11 
Col Wadsworth Construction v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995) 23, 44 
Commercial Security Bank v. Phillips, 655 P.2d 678 (Utah 1980) 14 
Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633 (Utah 1972) 13 
Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1990) 46 
Gillmor v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 1995) 2, 23, 24, 44 
Grayson v. Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989) 2 
Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Company, 414 P.2d 963 ((Utah 1966) 17 
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.d 917 (Utah App. 1989) 24, 46, 48 
Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988) . . . . 18, 19 
Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P. 2d 770 (Utah 1978) 14 
Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) 20 
Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) 20 
v 
Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc, 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994) 50 
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Commission, 
659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983) 13, 14, 19 
Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994) 16, 17 
Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995) 17, 19 
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044 (Utah App. 1990) 11, 12 
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994) 16 
State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1995) 3, 44, 45 
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993) 50 
State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 1994) 2 
State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989) 16 
State v. Ww/e, 880 P.2d 18 (Utah App. 1994) 45, 46 
Stromqist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746 (Utah 1982) 11, 12 
Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980) 43 
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994) 2 
RULES 
Utah R. Civ P. 52 16, 23 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B 13, 15 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 104(a) 16 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 201 16 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 402 16 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Utah Court Rules Ann., ch. 12 17 
vi 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-1 et seq 16, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1995 as amended) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(4) 14 
OTHER 
Uniform Fire Code § 2.101 (1988) 20, 21 
Uniform Fire Code § 2.102 (1988) 21 
Uniform Fire Code § 9.103 (1988) 21 
Uniform Fire Code § 10.301 (1988) 21, 22 
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure'. Jurisdiction 2d § 3533 11 
vn 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
On about May 10, 1995, Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. filed 
a Petition for Extraordinary Relief. On about May 16, 1995, Al Bench 
filed a Motion to Dismiss. After a hearing, the Court entered an 
order dated August 30, 1995, denying the Motion to Dismiss. A full 
evidentiary hearing was held September 11, 12 and October 10, 1995. 
A Final Order of Dismissal in the case was entered December 12, 1995. 
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal of the Court's ruling on about 
November 3, 1995. Respondent/Cross-Appellant filed this Cross-Appeal 
on December 26, 1995. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1995 as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL. 
1. Whether the claims raised in the Indian Village Trading 
Post, Inc.'s Petition are moot. 
2. Whether Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. has another plain, 
adequate and speedy remedy available. 
3. Whether Al Bench was an inferior court, administrative 
agency or officer exercising the judicial functions as contemplated 
by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B. 
4. Whether the review by the Court of Al Bench's discretion 
sought in Indian Village Trading Post, Inc.'s Petition is within the 
scope of relief contemplated under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
1. Did the Court rely on credible evidence in reaching its 
decision that the then Fire Chief, Al Bench, acted within his 
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discretion as fire chief in declaring Petitioner's fire protection 
system to be inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities? 
2. Did the Court err by excluding certain evidence presented by 
Petitioner? 
3* The Court should ignore any future reference to issues 
raised by Petitioner in its Amended Docketing Statement that were not 
addressed in its brief to the Court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL. 
Motions to dismiss present for review only conclusions of law, 
hence the appellate court is free to reappraise the court's legal 
conclusions. These conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference to the trial court's ruling. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 
872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994); State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL. 
When reviewing trial court decisions, the reviewing court 
presumes them to be correct and searches for grounds upon which they 
may be upheld. Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance 
Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992). While legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness, a trial court's findings of fact are given 
deferential review as the judge has the opportunity to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses. Grayson v. JRoper Ltd. Partnership v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989). When reviewing a trial court's 
findings of fact, they are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Gillmor v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 1995). 
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The reviewing Court will not overturn a court's decision on the 
admissibility of evidence unless there has been an abuse of 
discretion, such that the admission was "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1995) 
(citations omitted). Even if the court erred in admitting the 
challenged evidence, the reviewing court will only reverse the lower 
court if the error was harmful. If, absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that an outcome more favorable to the 
challenging party would have been reached, then error will be found. 
Id. at 699. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At issue in Petitioner's appeal is whether the Court correctly 
found that then Chief Bench relied on reliable and credible evidence 
in determining that the Petitioner Indian Village Trading Post, 
Inc.'s ("Indian Village") fire fighting system was inadequate for 
safe fire fighting capabilities. The Uniform Fire Code ("UFC") vests 
the fire chief with ultimate substantive discretion. Among those 
items of discretion included are the fire chief's responsibilities to 
designate the location of fire hydrants, determine whether they meet 
minimum flow requirements and whether such systems are adequate for 
local fire fighting needs. 
Indian Village commenced the construction of an addition to a 
pre-existing building in late 1990. In August 1990, then Chief 
Bench, accompanied by John Elder of the state Fire Marshal's office, 
designated where fire hydrants should be installed. Indian Village 
did not install them where then Chief Bench had designated. 
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Among other things, during the course of construction then Chief 
Bench conducted a number of water flow tests on the hydrants to 
determine whether they were adequate for local fire fighting needs. 
After a final test on November 1, 1991, he determined that while 
there was adequate water available from the town system to provide 
the required flow, the Petitioner's hydrant configuration was 
inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities. He based this 
decision on several factors; the age of his equipment, the lack of 
training of his men, the fact that town fire fighters are all 
volunteers, the location of the Indian Village complex as well as the 
results from the water flow test. 
Petitioner utilized its administrative remedies and appealed 
then Chief Bench's decision. Two specially convened Review Boards 
upheld then Chief Bench's decision at every point along the way in 
the course of construction. Thereupon, Petitioner brought the suit 
in the District Court which was ultimately dismissed. Petitioner 
allowed its time for appeal to lapse. Ultimately, Petitioner filed 
a petition for an extraordinary writ and a hearing was granted. 
After the hearing and before a Final Order of Dismissal was entered 
by the District Court, Petitioner filed this appeal. Respondent has 
filed a Cross-Appeal based on the Fifth District Court's order on 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Al Bench was the Fire Chief and Fire Marshall for the 
Rockville-Springdale Fire Protection District during the years of 
1990, 1991 and part of 1992. 
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2. Indian Village is the owner of real property located in the 
town of Springdale and was constructing a 12,000 square foot addition 
to existing improvements from late 1990 through early 1992. R. 
00743. 
3. As the Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, among many other 
things done in his official capacity, Al Bench conducted a water flow 
test on hydrants located on and around Indian Village's property on 
July 12, 1991. R. 00506. These hydrants had not been installed 
where then Chief Bench had designated. R. 00746. 
4. As the then Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, Al Bench placed 
a red tag on Indian Village's construction project on about July 13, 
and again on about August 15, 1991. R. 00002. 
5. Again, based on the decisions and actions taken by then 
Chief Bench, Indian Village filed an appeal with the Fire Protection 
District. R. 00692. This appeals panel was composed of 
disinterested parties from the community, not members of the Fire 
Protection District. R. 00069. After reviewing the complaint and 
the evidence, this special panel determined that then Chief Bench was 
acting within his authority and discretion and upheld his decisions 
to that point. R. 00132, 00761. 
6. As the then Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, on about November 
1, 1991, Al Bench conducted another water flow test. R. 00931. 
7. By letter dated December 10, 1991, Al Bench, as the then 
Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, notified Indian Village, of the results 
of the November 1, 1991 flow test. R. 00063. 
8. At that time, Indian Village's fire protection system was 
deemed to be inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities. Id. 
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9. As the then Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, in his December 
10, 1991 letter to Indian Village, Al Bench proposed four solutions 
to Indian Village to rectify the problem of its inadequate fire 
fighting system. Jd. 
10. Pursuant to Indian Village's request, a special Board of 
Appeals was convened on January 30, 1992, to review, among other 
things, the results of the November 1, 1991 flow test. R. 00709, 
00786. 
11. The January 30, 1992 Appeals Board upheld the determination 
of Al Bench in all respects and, in particular, with regard to the 
November 1, 1991 flow test. R. 00132. 
12. In about March 1992, Al Bench resigned as Fire Chief and 
about July of 1994, resigned as Fire Marshall for the Rockville-
Springdale Fire Protection District. 
13. In or about March, 1991, Petitioner filed suit in the Fifth 
District Court, seeking among other things, a preliminary injunction 
to have the red-tags lifted. The Court denied the request. R. 
00031. 
14. In or about April, 1992, the Fifth District Court dismissed 
Petitioner's lawsuit without prejudice. Petitioner did not appeal 
the dismissal. Rather, shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed suit in 
Federal District Court. R. 00031. 
15. On about May 10, 1994, Indian Village filed a Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief before the Fifth District Court requesting that 
the Court review the November 1, 1991 test and determine if the test 
showed that the system was not adequate for safe fire fighting 
capabilities. R. 00001. 
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16. On about May 16, 1995, Al Bench filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Indian Village's Petition for Extraordinary Relief. R. 00028. 
17. After a hearing, the Court entered an order dated August 
30, 1995, denying the Motion to Dismiss the Petition. R. 00092. 
18. A full evidentiary hearing was held on Indian Village's 
Petition, which spanned three days, September 11, 1995, September 13, 
1995, and October 10, 1995. R. 00472-01022. 
19. The Court entered a Memorandum Decision dismissing Indian 
Village's Petition which was reduced to an Order of Dismissal and 
entered on December 12, 1995. R. 00131, 00163. 
20. Indian Village filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court's 
ruling on about November 3, 1995 after issuance of the Fifth District 
Court's Memorandum Decision. R. 00149. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
CROSS-APPEAL 
Utah Courts only decide actual controversies. Where no 
controversy lies, the case will be deemed moot and Utah Courts will 
not adjudicate moot cases. Petitioner filed this action against Al 
Bench as the then Fire Marshall and Fire Chief of the Rockville-
Springdale Fire Protection District. Al Bench, however, is no longer 
either the Fire Marshall or the Fire Chief. The Fire District, under 
whose authority Al Bench served, is not a party to the action below. 
Any order entered by the Fifth District Court on Indian Village's 
Petition would have utterly no affect. 
As a result of the Petitioner's refusal to comply with his 
directives during the course of construction, then Chief Bench red-
tagged the Indian Village complex for having inadequate fire 
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protection, among other things. By March of 1992, Petitioner 
complied with the requirements set forth by then Chief Bench and the 
red-tags were lifted. These actions, along with the fact that Al 
Bench is no longer the Fire Chief or Fire Marshall, have eliminated 
any controversy that may have existed, thus rendering this case moot. 
To render an opinion in this case would be to render an advisory 
opinion and Utah Courts do not give advisory opinions. 
Under Utah law, an extraordinary writ is only issued if the 
petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy available 
to it. An extraordinary writ is not appropriate when the purpose for 
which it is sought is to appeal an administrative decision. In the 
spring of 1991, Petitioner filed suit before the Fifth District Court 
seeking a preliminary injunction to lift the red-tags then Chief 
Bench had placed on its property. The Court refused to grant the 
preliminary injunction. That case was eventually dismissed in early 
1992. Rather than appeal that decision to the appropriate Court of 
Appeals, Petitioner filed a suit in Federal District Court. 
Petitioner subsequently filed the instant action seeking an 
extraordinary writ in the Fifth District Court. Notably, every 
action filed by Petitioner is based on the same operative factual 
scenario. Petitioner failed to assert in its Petition that it has no 
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy nor did it make any showing 
of extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion. The purpose 
of Rule 65B is not, as attempted here, to salvage what is otherwise 
an untimely appeal. 
Al Bench is neither an inferior court, an officer exercising 
judicial functions or an administrative agency. As such, the relief 
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sought by Petitioner is beyond that provided under Rule 65B. Nor did 
Al Bench fail to perform an act required by law. Overall, the type 
of review sought by Petitioner was not within the scope of review 
contemplated by Rule 65B. 
Finally, the fire chief's discretionary decisions are given 
considerable deference and will not be overturned if based on 
substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is 
permissible and even if he made a mistake. Petitioner wanted the 
Court to determine that then Chief Bench made the wrong decision and 
then reverse it. This is not the type of review contemplated by Rule 
65B. Despite these flaws in the Petition, the Court erroneously 
granted Petitioner's request for a hearing. 
PETITIONER'S APPEAL 
When the District Court found that Al Bench had relied on 
credible, supporting evidence, but before the Final Order of 
Dismissal was entered, Petitioner filed this appeal. Petitioner 
asserts that the District Court's findings are clearly erroneous and 
are not supported by the evidence. However, Petitioner has failed to 
marshall the evidence to support such a contention. The Court, 
sitting alone, had the opportunity to review all the documents and 
hear all the testimony, including testimony from three experts. 
These experts included Charles B. Tandy, a sixteen-year veteran fire 
fighter, who in addition to having fought countless fires, has 
conducted numerous water flow tests, John Elder, a representative 
from the state Fire Marshall's office, certified in the 
interpretation of the UFC, and an academician, John Mertens, who 
while having studied what fire fighters do and understands the 
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physics of water flow tests, has never actually fought fires nor is 
certified in the interpretation of the code. Based on the evidence 
before the Court and especially relying on the testimony of Mr. Elder 
and Mr. Tandy, and taking into consideration its experience, the 
Court determined that Al Bench did not abuse his discretion in 
determining that the Indian Village fire fighting system was 
inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities. 
Petitioner also argues that the Court erred in excluding certain 
pieces of evidence. Unless the lower Court abused its discretion in 
excluding evidence, a reviewing court will not overturn that 
decision. The excluded evidence, the testimony of a non-disclosed 
expert and his flow calculations, which were relied on by John 
Mertens in his testimony, supra, was already before the Court, but 
more importantly was determined by the Fifth District Court to be 
irrelevant. The Court below was justified in excluding such 
evidence. 
While subtle principles of law state that a court need not 
address issues that a party has not briefed, failure to brief issues 
cannot be cured by addressing them in a reply brief as this presents 
the non-moving party from responding. Therefore, any attempt to 
address issues raised in an amended docketing statement but not 
raised in the original brief filed with the Court, should be ignored. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CROSS-APPEAL. 
A. THE ISSUES RAISED IK THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND AS SUCH, 
THIS CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
For an issue to remain justiciable, it must remain alive 
throughout the duration of the litigation, to the moment of final 
appellate review. Because some events overtake the pace of 
litigation, causing an issue to become moot, courts are reluctant to 
Mwaste their limited resources simply to satisfy curiosity or a naked 
desire for vindication." Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3533. 
Utah Courts will only decide actual controversies. To render an 
opinion in a moot case would be to render an advisory opinion and 
Utah Courts do not give advisory opinions. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 
P,2d X044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990). A case becomes moot when the 
judicial relief requested cannot affect the rights of the litigants. 
Bennion v. Sundance Development Corporation, 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 
1995). When an issue or case becomes moot, "fundamental principals 
of procedure dictate that [courts] not adjudicate moot cases..." 
Stromqist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746 (Utah 1982). In Stromquist, the 
plaintiffs brought an action against the Salt Lake County Assessor, 
Auditor, and Treasurer to force them to comply with their respective 
duties under the Utah Code. Jd. at 747. On a motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court found "that by the time of the hearing, the 
County Assessor had substantially complied with his statutory 
duties." Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that "in seeking to 
compel the defendants to perform certain acts which had been 
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performed even before the hearing in the trial court, the cases were 
moot from the beginning...M Id. at 748. 
Of utmost importance to this issue is the fact that Al Bench is 
no longer the Fire Chief or Fire Marshall. Therefore, any order 
directing him to perform any action would have no effect as he is no 
longer in any position of authority. Moreover, the Fire Protection 
District under which Al Bench served as Fire chief and Marshall is 
not a party to the action below. What is more, there is no action 
that can be taken or any order issued that would have any affect as 
the red-tags on Petitioner's property have long since been lifted and 
Petitioner's fire protection system approved. Therefore, any order 
in this case would be, at best, an advisory opinion, and Utah Courts 
do not render advisory opinions. Reynolds, 788 P.2d at 1045. 
Furthermore, the actions of the parties have rendered this issue 
moot. Indian Village complied with then Fire Chief's requirements of 
making its fire protection system safe. R. 00801. Al Bench lifted 
the red tags. Indian Village completed construction of its project 
and subsequently opened for business. R. 00804. These actions alone 
have eliminated any controversy that may have existed between the 
parties. Reynolds, 788 P.2d at 1045. However, as stated supra, Al 
Bench is no longer the Fire Chief and cannot be compelled to take any 
action in this case. The only basis for this appeal is Indian 
Village's insatiable need to feel it has been vindicated. Petitioner 
simply wants the Court to tell Al Bench that he was wrong. As 
discussed in greater detail infra, that purpose is an improper basis 
for review. 
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B. INDIAN VILLAGE HAD ANOTHER PLAIN/ ADEQUATE AND SPEEDY 
REMEDY. 
Petitioner originally sought relief from the Court under Rule 
65B(e)(2) (A) and/or (B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Relief 
under this rule may be granted: 
(A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion; 
(B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation 
or person has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty 
of office, trust or station; 
Utah R. Civ, P. 65B(e)(2)(A),(B). However, relief under this rule 
may only be granted where there is no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy available. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). If other avenues 
of relief are available to Petitioner, it must avail itself of those 
other remedies. If it chooses to ignore a plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy at law, it will place itself out of reach of an extraordinary 
writ. Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972); 
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Commission, 659 P.2d 
1065, 1067 (Utah 1983). 
Throughout the continuing dispute between then Chief Bench and 
Petitioner, Petitioner repeatedly sought review of Al Bench's 
decision through administrative channels. Petitioner has appeared 
before two separate Appeals Boards. Petitioner has appeared before 
the Fire Protection District and before two separate specially called 
Appeals Boards. R. 00069, 00709. In every instance, these Boards 
upheld Al Bench's decision. R. 00132. When it was not satisfied 
with the determinations of the Fire District, Petitioner filed suit 
in the Fifth District Court. R. 00132. After several months of 
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wrangling, the Fifth District Court, dismissed Petitionees claims. 
R. 00132. Rather than pursue the obvious plain and appropriate 
remedy, that is an appeal of the District Court's decision to the 
appropriate Court of Appeals, Petitioner waited for over a year and 
then sought an extraordinary writ. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(4). See 
Commercial Security Bank v. Phillips, 655 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1980) 
(Recourse was to pursue remedy of appeal). Petitioner also filed a 
lawsuit in the Federal District Court for violation of its civil 
rights based entirely on the same factual scenario reviewed by two 
appeals boards, the Fifth District and sometime later, resurrected in 
the form of this action for extraordinary relief. The petition, on 
its face fails to assert that no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy existed, nor did Petitioner make any showing of extraordinary 
circumstances of any nature to support the granting the relief 
demanded. "For these reasons alone the writ could be denied." 
Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P. 2d 770, 772 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). 
The law is clear that "a writ is not a substitute for other 
remedies which are available in the regular course of judicial 
process." Merrihew, 659 P.2d at 1067. In Merrihew, the plaintiff 
sought a writ of mandamus directing reinstatement of its building 
permit. The court held, however, that by "ignoring a plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy at law, plaintiff/s placed themselves out of 
reach of the extraordinary writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is 
not a substitute for and cannot be used in civil proceedings to serve 
the purpose of appeals, certiorari, or writ of error." Id. at 1067. 
If a party once had an adequate remedy by appeal, but permits it to 
lapse, he does so at his own peril and cannot rely on relief by use 
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of an extraordinary writ. Anderson v. Baker, 296 P.2d 283, 286 (Utah 
1956)• Because Petitioner had lost its right to appeal, in hopes of 
obtaining relief, Petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary 
relief. However, despite the fact that the District Court granted 
its request, it was improper to do so. Id. 
That the Petitioner here allowed the time for an appeal to 
lapse, does not defeat the requirement or lead to the conclusion that 
Petitioner did not have another plain, adequate and speedy remedy. 
If this were the case, litigants could circumvent the time limit 
imposed on appeal whenever it suited their fancy. See Anderson v. 
Baicer, 296 P.2d 283, 286 (Utah 1956). This is not the purpose or 
function of Rule 65B. 
C. AL BENCH IS NOT AN INFERIOR COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OR 
OFFICER EXERCISING JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. 
Relief under Rule 65B(e) can be granted if an "inferior court, 
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions" has 
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion or has failed to 
perform an act required by law. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) (2) (A) (B) . 
Petitioner failed to allege or show how Al Bench acted in any of 
these capacities, that jurisdiction or discretion had been abused or 
how an act required by law was not performed. 
1. Failure to perform an act required by law. 
Beginning with the latter, Petitioner has failed to allege or 
show that then Chief Bench "failed to perform an act required by law 
as a duty of his office, trust or station." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(e)(2)(B). Rather, Petitioner has brought this action because of 
an action that the then Chief Bench was required to take under the 
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UFC. The typical action brought under 65B(e)(2)(B) is exemplified in 
Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994). In Preece, the Petitioner 
sought extraordinary relief to force the Board of Pardons to comply 
with its own administrative rules. Jd. at 512. Petitioner was not 
asking the Court to force Al Bench to comply with anything. On the 
contrary, all Petitioner wanted the Court to do was examine the 
discretionary decision of then Chief Bench and reverse that decision. 
See Petition R. 00001-00003. 
2. Al Bench is neither an inferior court nor an officer 
exercising judicial functions. 
Clearly Al Bench is not an inferior court1 nor is he an officer 
exercising judicial functions. An officer vested with the authority 
to exercise judicial functions has the authority to: determine 
questions of admissibility of evidence and the existence of a 
privilege2, exclude irrelevant evidence3, take notice of adjudicative 
facts4, as well as make findings of fact and conclusions of law5, and 
impose sentences6. Those carrying out judicial functions are also 
1
 The following are Courts of Justice and Record: the Supreme 
Court, the Court of Appeals, district courts, circuit courts, 
juvenile courts, and justice courts. Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-1. 
2
 Utah Rules of Evidence, 104(a); Ambus v. State Board of 
Education, 858 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1993). 
3
 Utah Rules of Evidence, 402. 
4
 Utah Rules of Evidence, 201. 
5
 Utah R. Civ P. 52. 
* Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989). 
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subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct7 as well as the Judicial 
Code8. As the former volunteer Fire Chief and Fire Marshall he did 
not and does not possess any of these qualities nor he is subject to 
these sections of the code. 
3. Administrative agency. 
Similarly, Al Bench is not an "administrative agency." 
Administrative agencies have been described as having "members," 
being appointed by a legislative official, for specified periods of 
time, having delineated purposes and objectives as well as reasonable 
rules and regulations. Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching 
Company, 414 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah 1966), see also Preece, 886 P.2d at 
511, (Board of Pardons has administrative rules governing its 
actions.) At best, Al Bench was one representative of a Fire 
District, operating under the authority of that district and the 
discretion allowed the fire chief under the Uniform Fire Code. 
D. THE REVIEW SOUGHT BY PETITIONER WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE 
CONTEMPLATED BY RULE 65B. 
In deciding whether to grant a petition for extraordinary 
relief, a court looks at the following factors: (1) the nature of the 
relief sought; (2) the circumstances alleged in the petition; and (3) 
the purpose of the type of writ sought. Renn v. Utah State Board of 
Pardons 904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995). 
In its Petition, Petitioner set forth facts stating that the 
then Fire Chief had placed red tags on Petitioner's building project 
7
 Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Utah Court Rules Ann., 
ch. 12. 
8
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-1 et. seg. 
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alleging that the fire protection system was inadequate. R. 00001-
00003. Petitioner then avers that a water flow test conducted on 
November 1, 1991 showed that the system was in compliance with Table 
III-A of the Uniform Fire Code but that the then Fire Chief would not 
lift the red tags, stating that the test showed that the system was 
not adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities. Petitioner sought 
to have the Court review then Chief Bench's conclusions from the 
November 1, 1991 test and see if it complied with Table III-A of the 
UFC and whether hydrant number three was dangerous by taking evidence 
on these issues. R. 00002 
In considering a petition for an extraordinary writ the District 
Court reviews the process, rather than the decision. When reviewing 
the fire chiefs discretionary decisions, his findings of fact will be 
"accorded substantial deference and will not be overturned if based 
on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence 
is permissible." Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 
767 P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 1988). It is not the Court's position to 
second guess the fire chief, but examine whether he abused his 
discretion. Upon examination of Petitioner's request, it is clear 
that the "nature of the relief" it is seeking is to have the Court 
review and reverse the decision, not to review the process. 
Petitioner wants the Court to make the determination that Al Bench 
was wrong, as fire chief, when he determined that Indian Village's 
fire protection system was inadequate for fire protection, R. 00741, 
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or that he falsified9 the results. See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant 
at 47. This is not within the scope of review of the Court. Hurley, 
767 P.2d at 526-27. Al Bench may even have reached the wrong 
conclusion from information gathered at the flow test, but that does 
not justify the issuance of an extraordinary writ. Id. at 526. The 
appropriate consideration on review is whether then Chief Bench had 
substantial evidence on which to base his determination. Id. 
Petitioner has failed to satisfy Renn's first requirement, in that 
the nature of the relief in Petitioner's Petition is not comprehended 
under Rule 65B. Renn, 904 P.2d at 682. 
Second, as set forth more fully in response to Petitioner's 
appeal infra, Petitioner failed to show facts adequate to satisfy the 
circumstances requirement of Renn. Id. There were no facts 
presented to indicate that Al Bench abused his discretion as fire 
chief. Finally, Petitioner's attempt to utilize 65B as a basis for 
an appeal and reversal of the then Fire Chief Al Bench's decisions is 
an inappropriate purpose for Rule 65B. Petitioner fails Renn's third 
requirement. Jd.; see also, Merrihew, 659 P.2d at 1067; Anderson, 
296 P.2d at 286. 
9
 It is curious to note that Petitioner now claims that Al 
Bench falsified the results of the November 1, 1991 test. At the 
Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner's claims were quite 
different. Petitioner stated, "We accept the water flow test that 
he has stated in certain letters. There is no factual argument. 
The test. [In regards to the November 1, 1991 water flow test.] 
We're not questioning any of the facts, and whether that complies." 
Later, Petitioner states, "We're accepting everything, Your Honor. 
We say what he said the results do." Relevant portions of the 
hearing transcript on the Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief are attached hereto as Addendum "A" and 
made a part hereof. 
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Even overcoming the mootness and scope of relief problems supra, 
if the Court were to do what Petitioner had hoped it would, that is, 
review and overturn Al Bench's 1991 decisions, it would defeat the 
purpose of the separation of powers system of government. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated, "Where the responsibility for basic policy 
decisions has been committed to one of the branches of our tri-
partite system of government, the courts have refrained from sitting 
in judgment of the propriety of those decisions." Little v. Utah 
State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); 
Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995). 
The very relief sought by Petitioner in its Petition is not 
comprehended in Rule 65B, and on that basis, as well as the other 
bases set forth above, the Fifth District Court erred in denying 
Respondent Al Bench's Motion to Dismiss. 
II. ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF. 
A. UNDER THE UNIFORM FIRE CODE, THE FIRE CHIEF IS GIVEN BROAD 
DISCRETION IN ADMINISTERING AND ENFORCING THE CODE. 
At the time of the November 1, 1991 water flow test, the city of 
Springville had adopted the 1988 version of the UFC. Section 2.101 
of the UFC gives the fire chief responsibility for administering and 
enforcing the code. His duties include regulating the installation 
and maintenance of fire-extinguishing equipment as well as the 
maintenance of fire-protection equipment on existing structures and 
property as well as under construction. Uniform Fire Code, § 2.101 
(1988). Section 2.102 authorizes the fire chief to "make and enforce 
such rules and regulations for the prevention and control of fires 
and fire hazards as may be necessary from time to time to carry out 
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the intent of this code." Uniform Fire Code, §2.102 (1988). See §§ 
2.101 and 2.102, Uniform Fire Code. Relevant portions of the 1988 
Uniform Fire Code are attached hereto as Addendum "B" and made a part 
hereof. 
Section 10.301 (1988) of the UFC relates to the installation and 
maintenance of fire protection, life-safety systems and appliances 
and states in part: 
(a) Type Required. The Chief shall designate the type and number 
of fire appliances to be installed and maintained in and upon 
all buildings and premises in the jurisdiction other than 
private dwellings. This shall be done according to the relative 
severity of probable fire, including the rapidity with which it 
may spread. Such Appliances shall be of a type suitable for the 
probable class of fire associated with such building or premises 
and shall have approval of the Chief. 
(b) Special Hazards. In occupancies of an especially hazardous 
nature or where special hazards exist in addition to the normal 
hazard of the occupancy, or where access for fire apparatus is 
unduly difficult, additional safeguards may be required 
consisting of additional fire appliance units, more than one 
type of appliance, or special systems suitable for the 
protection of the hazard involved... 
Uniform Fire Code § 10.301 (emphasis added). See Addendum "B." The 
UFC defines approval as follows: "Approved refers to approval by the 
chief as the result of investigation and tests conducted by him or by 
reason of accepted principles or tests by national authorities, 
technical or scientific organizations." Uniform Fire Code § 9.103 
(1988). See Addendum "B." 
Section (c) of § 10.301 refers to the water supply to a fire 
fighting system. It states that "there shall be provided, when 
required by the chief, on-site fire hydrants and mains capable of 
supplying the required fire flow." Uniform Fire Code § 10.301(c). 
The code specifically states that the chief may be "guided by the 
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provisions of Appendix III-A" of the code in determining the 
requirement for water flow for a fire protection system. Uniform Fire 
Code § 10.301(c) (1988), (emphasis added). See Addendum "B." It 
also states that the Chief is to approve the location, number and 
type of fire hydrants connected to the water supply capable of 
delivering the required water flow. Uniform Fire Code § 10.301(c) 
(1988). 
Section (f) of § 10.301 states that fire hydrant systems "shall 
meet the approval of the fire department as to installation and 
location and shall be subject to such periodic tests as required by 
the chief. Plans and specifications shall be submitted to the fire 
department for review and approval prior to construction." Uniform 
Fire Code, § 10.301(f). See Addendum "B." 
John T. Elder, the Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau of the 
State Fire Marshal's Office of the State of Utah, certified in the 
interpretation of the fire code, concurred that the UFC gives the 
Fire Chief broad discretion in the implementation of the code. R. 
00810. It was his testimony that the code endows fire chiefs with 
"almost unlimited discretion" because: 
every community is so different in their makeup and their 
equipment and their training and their manpower — whether 
they're a paid department or a — a volunteer department... You 
can go through the entire code, and it — it repeatedly says 
with the chief's approval or — or the discretion of the chief, 
or — or it — it's full of this. Because it realizes that 
there's just no black and whites out there. 
R. 00859. Mr. Elder did, however, acknowledge that the fire chief 
would need to be able to justify his decisions based on a rational 
basis. R. 00860. This rational basis would include the chief's 
manpower, their training or the fact that the chief would not want to 
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use a particular hydrant. R. 00860. In regards to the table in 
Appendix III-A of the UFC, Mr. Elder echoed the code in that this 
table is merely provided to be a guideline, despite the fact that a 
community may adopt the code. "It would be guidelines still. 
Because that's what the — the way it's referred to in the body of 
the text." R. 00857. "That's why it's in the appendix." R. 00858. 
B. THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY THEN FIRE CHIEF, AL BENCH, WAS 
RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE AND THEREFORE SUPPORTED HIS FINDINGS, 
AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE COURT'S, THAT INDIAN VILLAGE 
TRADING POST, INC.'S FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM WAS INADEQUATE. 
1. Trial Court's findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous• 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52(a). A 
finding of fact is clearly erroneous "if it is against the clear 
weight of evidence or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Cal 
Wadsworth Construction v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 
1995). 
When determining whether a factual finding is clearly erroneous, 
courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's determination, and if the court's determination is 
based on sufficient evidence, then the finding is not clearly 
erroneous. Gillmor, 904 P.2d at 706. Finally, 
[t]he clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential to the 
trial court's decisions because the witnesses and parties appear 
before the trial court and the evidence is presented there. 
Thus, the trial judge is * considered to be in the best position 
to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of 
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the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot 
hope to garner from a cold record,7 
Id. (citations omitted). If, after viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's determination, the court's 
findings are based on sufficient evidence, such findings will not be 
clearly erroneous. Id. 
Over the course of three days, evidence was presented to the 
Court on the issue of whether then fire chief, Al Bench, abused his 
discretion in reaching his conclusion, based on the water flow test 
conducted on November 1, 1991 that Indian Village's fire protection 
system was inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities. R. 00472-
01022. 
During the course of the hearing, testimony was presented by 
both parties. This testimony included expert witnesses, references 
to computer simulations, R. 00566, as well as testimony from the 
parties themselves. After the evidence had been presented and 
arguments made, based on the Court's own "knowledge,,f "judgment" and 
"competency," the Court evaluated the evidence and made its decision. 
Hardy v. Hardy, 116 P.d 917, 925 (Utah App. 1989). After hearing all 
the evidence presented, the Court was convinced and found that Al 
Bench relied on credible supporting evidence in determining that the 
Indian Village water supply system created a hazardous situation. 
2. Evidence relied on by Al Bench and presented to the 
Court. 
i. Placement of the hydrants. 
Late in 1990, Indian Village commenced construction of a 12,000 
plus square foot addition to an already existing building. R. 00743. 
On or about August 29, 1990, Al Bench, accompanied by John Elder 
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visited the construction site and indicated where two hydrants should 
be located. R. 00744-00745, 00811-00813. Terry West, owner of 
Petitioner, testified himself that he knew in August where then Chief 
Bench wanted the fire hydrants located. R. 00746. On or about 
November 1, 1990, Indian Village installed two hydrants, which are 
now known as hydrants number two and three, neither of which were in 
the locations designated by the Fire Chief. R. 00746. Indian 
Village did not install the hydrants where then Chief Bench and Mr. 
Elder had indicated, despite the fact that both the Fire Chief and 
the Fire Marshal's office believed that the locations had been 
designated in August, 1990. R. 00813, 00987. In fact, Mr. Elder 
stated that "I felt like it was concluded that that's where the 
hydrant — hydrants were going to go, and that Terry West had agreed 
to that. And — and when I left the site, I was confident that 
that's where the hydrants would go." R. 00813. 
On cross-examination of Mr. West: ffyou didn't put them in the 
locations they suggested, did you, sir?" lfNo, sir." R. 00746. In 
fact, Mr. West stated, in regards to the location of the hydrants, "I 
wanted one in one place, and Al wanted it in another place." R. 
00748. So despite the fact that Indian Village recognized that the 
Fire Chief had the discretion and authority to designate the location 
of the fire hydrants, R. 00749, Indian Village placed the hydrants in 
a different location, where it wanted them. R. 00740. 
Petitioner argues at length that there had been no official 
designation of the fire hydrants by then Chief Bench. Petitioner 
cites, as supporting this contention, a letter that then Chief Bench 
wrote to the town of Springdale on November 5, 1990. In that letter, 
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he stated that no hydrant designation had been made. This is an 
instance where Petitioner claims then Chief Bench tried to deceive 
the trial Court. On the witness stand, Al Bench explained the basis 
for making such a statement in that letter, despite having testified 
that the hydrants were designated in August, 1990. 
I used that language in that letter as a stop sign to prevent 
Mr. West from going forward with this project, because the 
hydrants were being placed somewhere I didn't want them. And at 
that point, I felt it necessary to use the language "there's no 
official designation," because had Mr. West been using the right 
process, he would not go forward without my proper designation. 
I was a little exasperated by what was going on at that time, 
because the hydrants were going in where I did not want them. 
I thought at that time if I used that language as a stop sign, 
it was to say, "They need to be where I want them, not where you 
want them." That was really the message. 
R. 00966. The language referred to as evidence of deception by Al 
Bench is at worst, unartful. Indeed the Court below found no 
evidence of dishonesty. The hydrants were not, in fact, installed 
where they had been designated. Rather, they were installed where 
Petitioner wanted to install them, without the authorization of then 
Fire Chief, Al Bench. 
ii. Flow Tests. 
In March of 1991, John Elder conducted a flow test. "This was 
after I became aware that these two hydrants [numbers two and three] 
had been placed in the back contrary to what I thought was going to 
happen. And — and I was a little concerned, because they were both 
on a six inch dead end line...[and] we don't permit two hydrants to 
be placed on a six inch dead end line..." R. 00814. As a result of 
the March 1991 test, it was determined that there was insufficient 
flow to the hydrants, R. 00815. Mr. Elder, then directed that 
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another flow test be conducted. The reason for another test was to 
determine whether hydrant number three was dry or if there was any 
significant flow. If the hydrant was dry or had insignificant flow, 
then Indian Village would have been required to run the fire line to 
the north and connect it to the line on the highway, thus providing 
a looped system. R. 00854, See Exhibit ,fE,M Brief of 
Petitioner/Appellant. 
Mr. Elder conducted this subsequent test on July 2, 1991. He 
did not require Indian Village to loop the system because he turned 
the responsibility of dealing with the results and handling the 
situation over to Chief Bench. R. 00854. The results of that test 
indicated that there was only 1,800 gallons per minute ("GPM") 
flowing from the two hydrants and that there was a needed flow of 
2,750 to 3,000 GPM. R. 00759. This test was done using borrowed 
equipment, the reliability of which, Chief Bench was unsure of. R. 
00692. As a result of that test, the fire district insisted that 
Indian Village install a third hydrant for adequate water flow and 
fire protection. 
A third flow test was conducted on July 12, 1991. By this time, 
the number one hydrant had been installed. Using the same borrowed 
equipment, flow tests were conducted on hydrants one, two and three. 
Hydrant number one flowed 2,120 GPM, number two, 1,344 GPM and number 
three 822 GPM, however, not all hydrants were flowing simultaneously. 
Number one was tested when flowing by itself. Number two was tested 
with number one flowing. Then, when number three was tested, all 
three hydrants were flowing. R. 00518-00520. The test was conducted 
this way in response to Mr. Elder's request to determine what the 
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water flow would be to hydrant number three if all three hydrants 
were flowing. R. 00522. 
Based on the results of the test, Chief Bench concluded that 
there was insufficient water flow to hydrant number three. R. 00761. 
Several suggestions were then made to Indian Village on ways to make 
the system safe. These alternatives included looping the system, 
installing a sprinkler system or installing another hydrant. R. 
00770-00771. 
Because Chief Bench had been using borrowed equipment, the 
accuracy of which was questionable, he had the Fire District purchase 
its own equipment so that he could conduct another flow test of the 
hydrant system. This final test took place on November 1, 1991. R. 
000063. 
While he had been trained in his fire science courses on how to 
conduct water flow tests, to ensure that he conducted the flow test 
correctly, Chief Bench contacted the fire academy to make sure he was 
using correct methods. R. 00932. 
After consulting with an instructor at the academy, Chief Bench 
conducted the water flow test of Indian Village7s hydrants. Even 
though there was a fourth hydrant, Chief Bench did not test that one. 
It was not an accepted hydrant because it was located under a power 
line, which fact had been previously communicated to Petitioner. R. 
00933. 
Charles Tandy, a battalion chief and sixteen year veteran with 
the Provo City Fire Department, testified that he has conducted many 
water flow tests and that Al Bench tested the hydrants as he would 
have tested them. R. 00872. 
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Chief Bench conducted the test with the following results: 
It was determined that the flow from hydrant #1, located on Hwy 
9 in front of your establishment on the 10" water line, produced 
2120 GPM. The pitot gauge read 40 PS I (pounds per square inch) 
with two 2 1/2" ports flowing and the #3 hydrant flowing 
(located at the southeast corner of your establishment). The #3 
hydrant had one 2 1/2" port flowing and showed a pitot reading 
of 24 PSI which produced 820 GPM. 
The #2 hydrant...was used to determine the static pressure of 70 
PSI, and the residual pressure of 43 PSI. The combined flow of 
the #1 and #3 hydrants was 2940 GPM at 43 PSI residual pressure. 
R. 00063. 
While the test showed that there was adequate water available 
from the town to provide the required 2750 GPM flow, the calculations 
showed that: 
at 20 PSI, only 1090 GPM is available to the #2 and #3 hydrants 
on the dead end 6" line with the #1 hydrant flowing. This 
reenforces the previous tests conducted by Jon Elder and myself 
which showed poor fire flow from those hydrants. The system is 
not adequate for safe firefighting capabilities. 
R. 00063. 
Al Bench testified before the Court, citing the reasons why he 
concluded the fire protection system was inadequate and unsafe. He 
based his conclusions on the fact that there was 820 GPM available 
out of hydrant three, that it was on a dead-end, six-inch line, and 
if another engine were to hook up to hydrant two and begin pumping, 
that hydrant three would be rendered inoperable. Therefore he 
determined that is was not safe and required Mr. West to correct the 
inadequacy. R. 00937. It was his fear that if two pumpers were 
hooked up to hydrants two and three, they would compete for water, 
and depending on how strong the competition, the system runs the risk 
of collapse and the pumps of cavitation. R. 00938. 
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Al Bench testified that he relied on several other factors in 
reaching his conclusion. He considered the experience and training 
of his fire fighters, which was minimal. They are all volunteer fire 
fighters, who respond to a fire when summoned. R. 00938-00939. He 
also considered his equipment. At that time, his primary response 
unit was a 1948 Maxim truck, with a water pump gauge that was 
unreliable and that may or may not have worked. R. 00939, 00949. It 
was also necessary to consider that the Indian Village complex was 
located in downtown Springdale, the most congested part of town. R. 
00939. Next, the then Chief Bench considered the water supply 
available across the street. This was a 40 year old system and he 
did not trust the water lines, fearing that they could break if too 
much water was drawn from them10. R. 00939-00940. He also had to 
take into account the immediate exposures. Next door, approximately 
twenty feet away, was a "bed & breakfast" with a wood shingled roof. 
The radiant heat from a fire could cause such a building to easily 
catch fire. R. 00940. Finally, Chief Bench realized that he would 
have to rely on mutual aid agreements with Zion National Park and 
Hurricane City. Mutual aid agreements mean that if Springdale had a 
fire larger than it could handle, either or both of these other fire 
departments would send a unit to assist in putting out the fire. R. 
10
 This is another instance where Petitioner claims Chief 
Bench lied to or tried to deceive the court. Chief Bench had used 
the line across the street to approve a permit for a T-shirt shop, 
but did not want to depend on it for fire protection for the Indian 
Village complex. The evidence before the court was that this shop 
was quite small and would not have required the same amount of 
water flow or pressure to combat a fire as would the Indian Village 
complex, thus making it adequate for the fire protection of the T-
shirt shop but inadequate for Indian Village. R. 00986-00987. 
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00940-00941. After taking all these things into consideration, and 
based on the results of the November 1, 1991 test, the then Chief 
Bench concluded that Indian Village's system was "not adequate for 
safe firefighting capabilities.w R. 00063. 
Mr. Elder was provided only the number portion of the November 
1, 1991 flow test results and was asked by Mayor Robert E. Ralston of 
Springdale, to render an opinion on the adequacy of the system. On 
February 7, 1992, he wrote a letter to Mayor Ralston. In that letter 
he stated, that based on the figures provided to him, that the code 
requirements for fire flow had been met. R. 00823-00824. Petitioner 
cites to this letter in support of its position that its fire 
fighting system had met the code requirements. See Brief of 
Petitioner/Appellant at 35. However, it is important to look at the 
reasons behind these statements and not merely examine them in a 
vacuum. 
When asked if the statements made in his letter to the mayor of 
Springdale and the statements made by the then Chief Bench in his 
December 10, 1991 letter were at odds, Mr. Elder responded as 
follows: 
No, I don't think so. Because what I was doing here was I was 
responding to information that I had not seen prior to the 
letter from Mayor Ralston, and I was responding strictly as a — 
a response to the code, irrespective of — of any other 
influencing factors. And this is — strictly according to the 
code.•. 
R. 00824. In drafting this letter, Mr. Elder did not take into 
consideration the nature of the fire fighting force in Springdale, 
the manpower, the equipment or anything else that the city would have 
but simply wrote the letter based on the information provided by 
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Mayor Ralston and interpreting the information strictly according to 
the code. R. 00824-00825. While he has the qualifications to 
interpret the code, he does not have the qualifications to "second-
guess the fire chief" in implementing the code. This is because the 
fire chief: 
has the ability to fight the fire. He knows his equipment, he 
knows his manpower and knows all those relative factors there. 
When I advise them, I — I advise them as to what the code says, 
and — and I — I counsel with them on reasonableness. But — 
but the fire chief has the — the final say on it. 
R. 00825. 
Despite the findings in his letter that based strictly on the 
numbers, Indian Village's system met the appendix guidelines, Mr. 
Elder testified that the fire chief has the discretion in 
implementing the code and determining what is safe and adequate for 
a particular community. He further stated that in light of this 
discretion, the findings and recommendations in then Chief Bench's 
December 10, 1991 letter did not violate any provision of the UFC nor 
did they violate any of the guidelines in Appendix III-A of the UFC. 
R. 00858. 
iii. Appeals Boards. 
As a result of the findings of the July 12, 1991 test that there 
was insufficient water flow to hydrant three, Indian Village appealed 
to the Fire Protection Board of Appeals. R. 00692. This board was 
composed of neutral, disinterested members of the community, as 
opposed to members of the Fire Protection District. 
One of the issues addressed was whether there was adequate water 
flow out of hydrant number three to "bump the pitot gauge." The 
pitot is a device used to measure water pressure from a free flowing 
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hydrant. The units of measure start at five and increase in single 
increments upwards to 200. R. 00952. 
Before the board, the then Chief Bench testified that he 
couldn't get a reading on hydrant number three. R. 00692. At the 
time of the July 12, 1991 test, the then Chief Bench said in regards 
to the test, tf[i]t really did not move it one increment, but we gave 
[it] the benefit of the doubt." R. 00693. After examining all the 
evidence presented, the board chose to uphold the then Chief Bench's 
findings* 
After Mr. West received the results of the November 1, 1991 test 
he appealed for a second time to a Special Board of Appeals. A 
hearing was held on January 30, 1992. Again the then Chief Bench 
testified that on all tests conducted on hydrant number three, there 
was not enough water pressure to move the Pitot gauge. R. 00710-
00712. 
Before the Fifth District Court, Al Bench was challenged on this 
issue on cross-examination. When he conducted each test on hydrant 
three, he recorded a six, which would seem to indicate at least 
enough pressure to move the gauge one increment. The then Chief 
Bench testified that on each test the gauge did not quite get to the 
first increment, meaning a six, but on each test, he gave the hydrant 
the benefit of the doubt and recorded that the hydrant had registered 
a six. R. 00708, 00709. "And relatively speaking, six on a scale of 
200 is not bumping the gauge. It was a figurative form of speech 
that I was using to say how insignificant it was. Which I've said 
throughout the process, that there's insignificant flow..." R. 
00952-00953. Al Bench explained further that when he appeared before 
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the Appeals Boards, "the board members had all the information and 
numbers in front of them. And I gave that same information verbally, 
as I remember it. So it wasn't as if I was trying to hide it or 
disguise it." R. 00953. Contrary to the Petitionees assertions 
that Al Bench is lying, all data related to pitot gauge readings and 
flow test results were provided every appeals board and, in fact, the 
water flow did not, or at best barely bumped the pitot gauge. The 
January 30, 1992 board upheld the discretion and findings of then 
Chief Bench. R. 00132 
iv. Solutions offered by then Chief Bench in his 
December 10, 1991 letter to Petitioner to make 
its system safe. 
As of mid-July 1990, Mr. West was aware of alternatives that had 
been suggested to make his system safe. supra. In then Chief 
Bench's December 10, 1991 letter, he incorporated the already 
discussed alternatives and added another option. Specifically, the 
then Chief Bench suggested: 
1) Loop the system. 
2) Sprinkle the building. 
3) Increase the size of the six inch line sufficiently to 
provide 1000 GPM to each hydrant with the #1 hydrant 
flowing. 
4) Install a hydrant at the mark designated by the District in 
front of the Laundromat and remove the #3 hydrant. 
R. 00770-00771, 00063. While the option to increase the size of the 
pipe to allow for 1,000 GPM was a new alternative, it was never an 
absolute requirement, contrary to Petitioners claims. See 
Petitioner/Appellant's Brief at 15. These were options. No one 
single option was ever required. At no time did then Chief Bench 
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ever require one over the other. Mr. Tandy testified that he 
believed that these alternatives were a good way to address Indian 
Village's concerns and that offering such options were very much 
within then Chief Bench's discretion. R. 00890. 
When Mr. West appeared before the January 30, 1992 Board, he 
agreed to remove one of his hydrants and move the hydrant that was 
under the power line. That is, Mr. West agreed to option number 4. 
R. 00995-00996. However, he failed to do this. Later, Mr. West 
decided that rather than remove the hydrant, he would install an 
eight-inch line, thereby increasing the pressure. R. 00992-00993. 
By this time, however, the January, 1992 Board of Appeals had grown 
weary of Petitioner's delays and refusal to comply, had modified the 
alternatives in then Chief Bench's December 10, 1991 letter and would 
not allow Mr. West to install the eight-inch line, but rather 
required that he comply with his original agreement to remove the 
hydrant. R. 00993-00998. Therefore, contrary to Petitioner's 
assertions that then Chief Bench refused to allow Mr. West to comply 
with one of the alternatives suggested in his letter, it was the 
Board of Appeals who refused to allow Mr. West to proceed as he 
wanted and insisted that he proceed as he had agreed. R. 00992-
00993. 
v. Two hydrants on a six-inch, dead-end line 
created a fire hazard to fire fighters and if 
used simultaneously, would not provide adequate 
protection. 
The state Fire Marshall's office does not allow two hydrants to 
be placed on a six-inch dead-end line. This is because of the 
possibility of not having enough water to pump from one hydrant while 
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water is being drawn or drafted from the other hydrant. R. 00814. 
This is the reason that Mr. Elder required that Indian Village,s 
system be tested. Supra. This was one of the factors that then 
Chief Bench used in determining that the system was inadequate. 
Supra. Despite the fact that Mr. West did install hydrant number 
one, hydrants number two and three still remained on the dead-end, 
six-inch line and based on the results of the water flow tests, then 
Chief Bench concluded that the system was not adequate for safe 
firefighting. R. 00063. This conclusion was also supported by Mr. 
Elder, supra. R. 00824. 
Petitioner called John M. Mertens as an expert in fire 
protection. Mr. Mertens is a fire protection and safety engineer. 
R. 00548. He teaches courses on the hydraulic design of water 
supplies, water flow testing and friction loss. R. 00549-00551. Mr. 
Mertens, however, is not a fire fighter. R. 00591. While he has 
studied what firemen do, he does not consider himself a tactics 
expert nor has he ever fought a fire. R. 00592. He testified that 
based on the numbers in then Chief Bench's December 10, 1991 letter 
that Indian Village's system would be safe. R. 00566-00567. Like 
Mr. Elder similar conclusions, made in a vacuum, supra, Mr. Mertens 
did not take into consideration the any of the factors that a fire 
chief should take into consideration in determining whether a system 
was adequate or even those taken into account here by Al Bench. 
While agreeing that the fire chief has discretion in implementing the 
code, Mr. Mertens does not believe that the type of equipment 
available to a unit or their level of training play any role in 
determining the safety of a water delivery system. R. 00593-00595. 
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He also testified that based on the numbers represented by then Chief 
Bench's letter, that a fire department should be able to adequately 
fight a ,fnormal" fire, R. 00576. 
Later, during the course of the hearing, the Court heard 
evidence from Charles B. Tandy, of the Provo City Fire Department, 
Mr, Tandy has been with the Provo City fire department since 1979. 
Mr. Tandy is currently a battalion chief. As battalion chief, Mr. 
Tandy oversees four fire stations and 24 crew. He oversees all 
operations of the fire department when he's on duty. R. 00867. As 
a battalion chief, he is also an incident commander. This means that 
he orchestrates fire suppression tactics. R. 00867. He has also 
been certified in the fire code. R. 00866. 
Mr. Tandy served for five years as an inspector for the 
department fire prevention bureau. R. 00868. Part of those 
responsibilities included conducting flow tests and he has conducted 
a large number of such tests. R. 00868, 00869. Mr. Tandy had an 
opportunity to review a number of pieces of evidence in preparation 
to testify. He reviewed then Chief Bench's December 10, 1991 letter 
as well as listened to the testimony of Al Bench, Mr. Mertens, Mr. 
West and Mr. Elder. R. 00869, 00870. Based on all this information, 
Mr Tandy testified that the method used by then Chief Bench in 
conducting the November 1, 1991 flow test was appropriate and that he 
would have conducted the test the same way. R. 00872. Mr. Tandy 
also used then Chief Bench's test results and calculated the numbers 
in longhand, and came within two gallons per minute of the results 
reached by then Chief Bench. R. 00873. Mr. Tandy then expressed his 
opinion that the results reached and conclusions stated in then Chief 
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Bench/s letter were correct. R. 00874. The key to reaching his 
conclusion was based on the fact that hydrants two and three are on 
a dead-end, six-inch line which wouldn't produce enough flow if a 
fire department were pumping off those two hydrants. R. 00874. Mr. 
Tandy then explained to the Court the dangers that such a system 
would present. 
Upon arrival at a scene, the chief officer would determine, by 
quick calculations, what the fire flow would need to be to extinguish 
the fire. R. 00875. If there were a fire at Indian Village and an 
engine were to hook up to hydrant number three, and "you're not 
advancing your attack lines, you can easily be pumping at capacity." 
R. 00876. If a second engine arrived and hooked up to number two, 
that is where the danger lies. R. 00876. 
If you have fire fighters attacking a structure on the inside — 
say we have our fire fighters working off of engine number one, 
and they have charged attack lines, and they're doing an 
interior attack, which means they're inside the building working 
to extinguish the fire, which is the proper and the easiest way 
to attack a structure fire, they're using that water as a 
sprinkler and as a protective curtain for themselves. 
A fire inside a building will generate heat in the neighborhood 
of 900 to 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit. Fire fighters wear 
protective clothing, which is not a fireproof material, it's a 
fire retardant material. So it will burn. And fire fighters 
can't handle 900 degrees of temperature. We.'re not equipped to 
work, in that kind of a heat. So you use a fog pattern — a 
water shield to protect them from the heat that's being 
generated by the combustion inside. 
If an engine that was hooked to hydrant number two was pulling 
water in excess of the thousand gallons a minute, that would 
cause engine — the hydrant at — correction — the engine at 
hydrant number three to be starved for water in that he wouldn't 
have enough water to supply the demand needed by the attack 
lines. And that's where the — the danger of this come 
in...that you can starve your engine... 
R. 00876-00877. 
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Mr. Tandy then went on to explain another dangerous scenario 
presented by the Indian Village water supply system. Not only will 
a crew attack the fire on the inside of a building, but a crew will 
also attempt to protect surrounding buildings. Due to the extreme 
heat, if a "curtain of water" is not set up between the burning 
buildings and the surrounding buildings, those other exposed 
buildings run the risk of catching fire. R. 00879. 
If the crew pumping from hydrant three were putting up this 
curtain of water, and a second engine began pumping from hydrant 
number two, it is conceivable that the second engine could take all 
the water in the system and leave number three without a water 
supply, thus exposing surrounding structures to the radiant heat. R. 
00878-00879. 
If there were to be a fire at the Indian Village structure, 
based on the size of the building, Mr. Tandy stated that there would 
need to be a minimum of three engine companies. R. 00880. This then 
brought up a further safety question. Because Springdale would be 
unable to handle a blaze at the Indian Village site, only having two 
engines, they would need to enlist the aid of neighboring agencies. 
The problem lies in the level of training each department has as well 
as communication between the departments. Should the Springdale 
engines be pumping from hydrants one and three and another company 
comes in and begins pumping from number two, the situations described 
supra could occur due to a lack of communication between engineers. 
R. 00881-00882. 
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Another factor Mr. Tandy described is that there is never a 
"normal" fire, contrary to Mr. Mertens assertions11. There are so 
many different factors that affect a fire; the location, construction 
of a structure, occupancy of the structure, even the weather 
conditions. R. 00883. Therefore, there is never a "normal" fire and 
as such, a department must always train and plan for the worst 
situation possible. R. 00883. In this case, a worst case scenario 
would assume that the motel is full, it's late at night, there are 
people sleeping and others working, and you have an involved or fully 
involved situation, R. 00884, requiring three engines and their 
departments. R. 00880. Assuming such a situation, Mr. Tandy 
concluded that then Chief Bench's conclusions were reasonably based 
on the Uniform Fire Code. R. 00887. 
vi. Cavitation and collapse of the system. 
Al Bench testified that if a system is operated at less than 20 
PSI, there could be a danger of cavitation of a pumper truck or 
collapsing the system, R. 00529, and this was just one of many 
factors he considered. supra, R. 00938. Collapse refers to the 
collapse of the pipes due to too much suction and not enough water 
available to go through the pipes R. 00529. Cavitation deals with 
the pump on the engine. The pump must have a minimum pressure coming 
into it in order to prevent a phenomenon where the water would turn 
to steam, thus causing the pump packing, the seams and the pump to 
11
 Mr. Mertens testified that a normal fire at the Indian 
Village complex might involve a single room or possibly a second. 
R. 00576-00577. Therefore, based on that "normal" fire situation, 
a fire company would not be using more than 500 gallons per minute. 
R. 00579. 
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blow apart. R. 00892. To prevent this, a trained engineer must 
control the minimum inlet pressure by monitoring the appropriate 
gauge. R. 00569. 
The town of Springdale, however, is faced with the problem of 
old equipment and untrained personnel. R. 00938-00939, 00949. While 
the experts agree that the way to prevent collapse and cavitation is 
to have a trained engineer monitor the water pressure gauge on the 
engine, Springdale does not have this luxury. R. 00949. They must 
make do with what they have, an unreliable gauge and a volunteer fire 
department. While Petitioner argues that this is dangerous, it is 
the only system that was available to then Chief Bench. See Brief of 
Petitioner/Appellant at 20. Because 20 PSI is an accepted figure, R. 
00569-00570, and the then Chief Bench, in light of his equipment and 
personnel, knew of no other way to ensure that collapse and 
cavitation would not occur, other than to require 20 PSI, was 
justified in making the decision he did. 
Petitioner states that 20 PSI is not a code requirement. See 
Brief of Petitioner/Appellant at 20. However, Petitioner's own 
expert, Mr. Mertens states that 20 PSI is a requirement. While the 
code may not discuss it directly, it is a requirement. R. 00569-
00570. "I don't recall that the 1988 version has 20 PSI in it. It's 
a normally accepted figure, regardless of whether it's in there...But 
20 pounds, to me, would be the acceptable figure." R. 00638. 
Mr. Mertens testified to a great number of facts and details as 
to when a system would collapse or cavitate. If, as Mr. Mertens 
testified, that 20 PSI is a normally accepted figure, regardless of 
the actual physics of when a system collapses or cavitates, then 
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Chief Bench was justified in relying on the "normally accepted 
figure." Even if then Chief Bench was wrong in his belief that a 
system would collapse or cavitate at 20 PSI, it was only one factor 
he used in making his decision. R. 00938. As Mr. Tandy testified, 
cavitation was a problem, but the real problem was that there were 
two hydrants on a dead-end, six-inch line. R. 00891. 
C. PETITIONER FAILS TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD FRAUD, NOR IS IT A 
REQUIRED ELEMENT IN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ANALYSIS. 
Petitioner also asserts that Al Bench acted fraudulently, thus 
abusing his discretion. While in its Memorandum Decision, the Fifth 
District Court refers to the fact that Petitioner failed to show that 
then Chief Bench's decision was based on "fraud," unlike other state 
courts, Utah Courts have not adopted this as a basis for review. 
Petitioner cites to a New Mexico case, Chavez v. Sandia Corp., 555 
P.2d 699 (N.M. 1976) for the proposition that a court may review an 
administrative decision to see whether the decision was made in "bad 
faith." Petitioner then cites to Black's law dictionary for the 
definition of fraud. Petitioner then simply jumps to the conclusion 
that bad faith equals fraud. See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, at 
37. 
To establish a case of fraud, a strict list of elements must be 
proven: (1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
presenter either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to 
act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
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ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was 
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. Sugarhouse 
Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980). 
While Petitioner asserts that Al Bench acted fraudulently, that 
is all they are, assertions. Petitioner has failed to meet the 
elements required to prove fraud. Petitioner argues that Al Bench 
lied to the Court. See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant at 38, 39, 43. 
Petitioner, however, had ample opportunity to present evidence as 
well as cross-examine Al Bench regarding these alleged lies. The 
Court had the opportunity to hear all the evidence, including Al 
Bench's testimony and cross-examination, and still determined that 
these allegations of fraud and lies were, at worst, nothing more than 
n
misstatements.M R. 00138. 
D. THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THEN CHIEF BENCH AND THE LOWER 
COURT SUPPORT BOTH THEIR FINDINGS, 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found that the then 
Fire Chief relied on credible supporting evidence in making his 
determination that Indian Village Trading Post's "two fire hydrants 
on the dead-end six-inch line created a fire fighting problem." R. 
00137. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that it was 
convinced by the testimony of both Mr. Tandy and Mr. Elder. R. 
00136-37. In it's Memorandum Decision, the Court pointed to several 
factors in reaching it's decision. The Court noted that "[i]t is 
clear from the provisions of the Uniform Fire Code that the fire 
chief has broad discretion" in establishing, regulating and 
maintaining a fire protection system, including ensuring there is 
adequate water supply at the site to fight fires. R. 00135. While 
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the results from the water flow test show that the hydrants produced 
over 2,750 GPM, then Chief Bench determined that the distribution 
system was inadequate for safe fire fighting. R. 00136. Despite 
Petitionees assertions that once this water flow had been met, the 
requirements of the UFC had been met, such is not the law. The UFC 
does not contain any such limitation, but instead allows the fire 
chief to cure any dangerous situations on the property. R. 00136. 
The Court continued, stating that (1) the Petitioner had 
installed the fire hydrants without then Chief Bench's permission; 
(2) that the installation of two hydrants on a dead-end six-inch 
water line created a hazard to those who might fight a fire at the 
Indian Village complex; (3) that the hydrants, if used 
simultaneously, would not provide the needed flow to protect the 
building or those fighting the fire; (4) that then Chief Bench 
provided to Petitioner four possible solutions; (5) and that the 
problem was not the amount of water available, but the inadequate 
design of the delivery system. 
The lower Court judge had the opportunity to listen to the 
witnesses, assess their credibility and evaluate the evidence. 
Petitioner has failed to show that the lower Court's findings are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, Cal Wadsworth, 898 P.2d at 
1378, and as such are clearly erroneous. Gillmor, 904 P. 2d at 706. 
Finally, w[b]ecause Petitioner is merely realleging his version of 
the facts, this is insufficient to challenge the court's findings or 
conclusions." BluJbaugrh, 904 P.2d at 699. 
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E. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING CERTAIN PIECES OF 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER. 
1. Standard employed by the courts in determining the 
admissibility of evidence. 
A trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to 
admit or exclude expert evidence and his decision is to be upheld 
unless "manifestly erroneous.11 Salem v. U.S. Lines, Co., 370 U.S. 31 
(1962). Also, a reviewing court will not overturn a trial court's 
decision regarding the admissibility of evidence unless there has 
been an abuse of discretion. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 699, citing to 
State v. White, 880 P.2d 18 (Utah App. 1994). The Utah Court of 
Appeals in White stated: 
When reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding admissibility of 
evidence under Rule 403, we will not overturn the court's 
determination unless it was an abuse of discretion. The Utah 
Supreme Court has noted that the term abuse of discretion is not 
capable of precise definition. Instead a spectrum of discretion 
exists. .. [and] toward the broad end of the spectrum is the 
decision to admit or exclude evidence under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 403. The trial court has considerable freedom in 
applying [Rule 403] to the facts, freedom to make decisions 
which appellate judges might not make themselves ab initio but 
will not reverse. Therefore, we will only conclude that the 
trial court abused its discretion if the ruling in favor of 
admissibility was beyond the limits of reasonability. Finally, 
even if we conclude that the trial court's decision regarding 
admissibility was in error, we will only reverse if the error 
was harmful... 
White, 880 P.2d at 21 (citations omitted), (quotations omitted). 
While the Utah Supreme Court addressed the definition of "abuse 
of discretion" in regards to admissibility of evidence, it follows a 
fortiori that the same standards apply when a trial court rules 
evidence inadmissible. Id. Therefore, in this case, the lower 
Court's ruling to exclude certain pieces of evidence should be 
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overturned only upon a showing that the ruling was an abuse of 
discretion or "beyond the limits of reasonability." Id. 
Utah Courts further state that a reversal of the trial court's 
determination of the admissibility of proffered evidence will take 
place only where there was an abuse of discretion that affected the 
party's "substantial rights." Hardy, 776 P.2d at 924. An abuse of 
discretion affecting a party's substantial rights occurs, if viewing 
the evidence as a whole, there is a reasonable likelihood that a 
different result would have been reached, Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, 
Inc., 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1990). 
Finally, when a trial is before the court alone, the court's 
rulings on evidence need not be subjected to as critical an inquiry 
because in arriving at it's conclusions, the court will include in 
it's consideration, the judge's knowledge and judgment as to the 
materiality of the evidence as well as it's competency and effect. 
Hardy, 776 P.2d at 925. 
2. Evidence excluded by the Court, 
i. Rick Rosenberg. 
Indian Village attempted to introduce the testimony of Rick 
Rosenberg as an expert witness on computer simulations of water 
systems and that he was prepared to testify regarding computer 
simulations of Springdale's system. R. 00734. Petitioner proffered 
the following reasons why the testimony was relevant: (1) the 
computer simulation would have shown that the back two hydrants, with 
hydrant number one closed, could produce close to 900 GPM, if not 
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more12, R. 00735-00736; (2) that the test would show that hydrant 
number three was not dangerous and that the residual PSI would be 
greater than 20 PSI, R. 00738-00739; (3) that under various 
scenarios, there would be adequate water flow to the hydrants, R. 
00739-00740; and finally in a desperate attempt to get the testimony 
admitted, (4) that the test would show that there was more than 1,100 
gallons for hydrants two and three and that then Chief Bench was 
wrong. R. 00741. 
For each proffer made, the Court had to remind Petitioner that 
the issue was not what a test conducted after the fact or what 
various scenarios would show, but what information was available to 
then Chief Bench on November 1, 1991. Even if then Chief Bench had 
been wrong in his determination, the Court stated: "It may be. But 
the issue here is not whether he was wrong, but what the test showed. 
And the only test we can rely on is the test he had before him at the 
time. So it would appear to me that this information would be 
irrelevant, and the objection should be sustained." R. 00741. 
In its brief, Petitioner asserts for the first time that Mr. 
Rosenberg's testimony was offered to show that then Chief Bench had 
falsified the results of the November 1, 1991 test. See Brief of 
Petitioner/Appellant at 44. Upon review of the record, however, it 
is clear that this proffer was never made. Petitioner now asserts 
that Mr. Rosenberg's testimony would have established an element of 
fraud on then Chief Bench's part. As previously discussed, however, 
mere assertions do not meet the requirements of fraud. Moreover, 
12
 This information was already before the court through the 
testimony of Mr. Mertens. R. 00561, 00566. 
47 
virtually all the witnesses who testified, including Petitioner's 
expert, Mr. Mertens, testified that the numbers and calculations in 
Al Bench's December flow test report were correct. R. 00566-00567, 
00817, 00874. Petitioner's assertions that the results have in some 
way been falsified are directly contrary to the evidence presented to 
the Court. 
Further, in his testimony, Mr. Mertens testified that he had 
seen the results from Mr. Rosenberg's simulation, that such tests 
showed that it might be possible to get 1,500 GPM from hydrant three 
and that based on these numbers and tests, the system was safe. R. 
00566-00568. Even though Mr. Rosenberg himself did not testify to 
the results of the computer simulation, that information was before 
the Court. Mr. Rosenberg's testimony would have been duplicative. 
As Mr. Rosenberg's reports and the data contained were before the 
Court below, notwithstanding the Court's exclusion of Mr. Rosenberg, 
the Petitioner cannot argue that a different result would obtain had 
Mr. Rosenberg testified. Hence, no substantial right has been 
affected in the Court's exclusion. Hardy at 924. 
ii. Exclusion of reference to statements made at Fire 
Board meeting. 
Petitioner next asserts that had it been able to cross-examine 
then Chief Bench regarding some comments that were allegedly made at 
a fire board meeting, that a different result would have been likely. 
See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant at 48-49. There is nothing to 
support this contention. 
Had evidence been admitted that a discussion regarding the 
minimum flow for the back two hydrants had taken place at the March 
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1991 Fire Board Meeting, such evidence would still not be relevant. 
Even giving Petitioner the benefit of the doubt that such a 
discussion took place, such a discussion, months earlier, had no 
bearing on the test administered and evidence gathered on November 1, 
1991 or the conclusions reached as stated in the December 10, 1991 
letter. As the Court below correctly stated, the issue before the 
Court was what the test showed on November 1, 1991, R. 00741, not 
what may or may not have been said at a prior Fire Board Hearing. 
F« THIS COURT SHOULD IGNORE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER FOR 
REVIEW IN ITS AMENDED DOCKETING STATEMENT THAT ARE NOT 
ADDRESSED IN ITS ARGUMENT. 
In Petitioner's Amended Docketing Statement, Petitioner raised 
the following issues that were not addressed in his Brief to the 
Court. 
4. b. Did the trial Court error by excluding an audio tape from 
a Fire Board meeting held on March 6, 1991, that would have 
established that 555 g.p.m. was the minimum water flow from 
hydrant #3... 
4. c. Did the trial Court error by limiting the parties to two 
hours for the Respondent to give his direct testimony, for the 
Petitioner to cross examine the Respondent, for Petitioner to 
present rebuttal witnesses, and time for both parties to make 
their closing arguments. This time limitation resulted in 
Petitioner having to chose between using his last seven and one 
half minutes to present rebuttal witnesses or make his closing 
argument. Wayne Houston, Fire Chief of St. George, and Brent 
Gardner, Springdale's water engineer, were sitting in the Court 
ready to testify for Petitioner... 
See Petitioner's Amended Docketing Statement at 6-8. 
The specific issue addressed by Petitioner in its brief in 
regards to issue "b" was whether the Court was correct in sustaining 
an objection to a question asked Al Bench whether he had ever agreed 
that a minimum flow needed for the back two hydrants would be 550 
GPM, not that the Court erred in excluding the tape. Petitioner 
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stated that it had been furnished a copy of a tape from a Fire Board 
Meeting. See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant at 48. This is the only 
mention of a tape in Petitioner's Brief. Petitioner did not argue 
that the Court erred by excluding the tape. While a minor 
distinction, Petitioner failed to address the specific issue of the 
tape's admissibility. Petitioner completely fails to address issue 
•M.c." in its brief. 
It is well settled that a court need not address issues that a 
party has not briefed. Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc, 
875 P.2d 570, n. 3 (Utah App. 1994). Moreover, Petitioner cannot 
cure this problem by arguing it in its reply since an appellate court 
"will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief" 
as this prevents the nonmoving party the opportunity to respond. 
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993). Therefore, 
this Court should not allow argument or consider the issues raised in 
paragraphs 4.b. and 4.c. of Petitioner's Amended Docketing Statement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Respondent respectfully requests that 
this Court find that the Fifth District Court erred in denying 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and enter an order of dismissal; or, 
alternatively, affirm the Fifth District Court's ruling that Al Bench 
as the then Fire Chief did not in any way abuse his discretion. 
DATED this ^J day of May, 1996. C 
^^STIRBA &\^!PHAWAY 
By: \ V 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. 
Attorneys for 
Respondent/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of May# 1996, I mailed 
a true and correct copy, postage prepaid, of BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT/APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, to the following: 
Terry R. West 
P.O. Box 450 
Springdale, UT 84767 r~-
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THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. WEST: The Court on March 9, 1995, directed 
me to do exactly what I have done. In fact, on the 19th of 
March, 10 days after the Court directed me to do so, I 
filed this petition. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WEST: We do come under — in fact, we have 
litigated this before. Did I have a right for a 65B. And 
both — everybody agreed that I did. "You got the wrong 
party." So I don't know if you want to go into — into 
whether we have a standing under the rule. I don't think 
there's any question that we do under all three paragraphs, 
A, B, and C. 
Now, I don't know if you want me to direct 
ourselves to you. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to preclude it, but 
I've read your memorandum, and I've indicated what I think 
the issue is. Which is mootness. 
MR. WEST: Okay. Okay, Your Honor. 
Number one, Your Honor, we have never — under 
this petition, we are not objecting to any red tags. Which 
they have tried to say that we are objecting and want you 
to take facts on those red tags, Your Honor. We are not — 
we're not objecting to any of the facts underlying the 
water flow test. We accept the water flow test that he has 
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stated in certain letters. There is no factual argument. 
Our argument, Your Honor — it's his determination as a 
fire chief that they're not in compliance. 
Now, Your Honor, the — the respondent here — 
THE COURT: Let me interrupt you, if I can, 
right there. 
MR. WEST: Okay. 
THE COURT: And I don't want — I don't mean to 
interrupt your train of thought. 
MR. WEST: Just get to where it's bothering you, 
Your Honor# and — 
THE COURT: I just have a guestion that occurred 
to me. 
MR. WEST: Okay. 
THE COURT: What do you view as the Court's 
position — if we were to hold this hearing, would you want 
the Court to review all the evidence and see whether he 
decided the issue correctly? 
MR. WEST: No, sir. No, sir. 
THE COURT: What do you view as the standard — 
the burden of the Court? 
MR. WEST: The Uniform Fire Code leaves it to 
the discretion of the fire chief to determine whether — 
whether the water flow meets the compliance with the code. 
So it's very simple, actually. It's less than a half day 
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hearing. In fact# all we'd have to have is the letters. 
The test. We're not questioning any of the facts, and 
whether that complies. Now, it's real simple, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: What do you mean whether it 
complies? 
MR. WEST: Well, there's Table A — A and B in 
the Uniform Fire Code that states how many gallons per 
minute the fire system was required. It happened to be 
2,750 gallons a minute out of a number of the minimum of 
three fire hydrants. He took three tests, giving the 
readings of — of each fire hydrant with a total gallons 
per minute. 
Now, we say — and it's real simple, Your 
Honor. We say we meet the requirements of the tables of 
the Uniform Fire Code as to water flow capacity or 
requirement. The minimum. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. WEST: We are — we — we are asking — we 
were suing — it's not really a suit. We're — we're 
petitioning the respondent, which was the fire chief — his 
determination — the tests he made. Which there's no 
quibble over. We don't want to go into the facts, or how 
he made mistakes. We're accepting everything, Your Honor. 
We say what he said the results do. We do comply with the 
Uniform Fire Code. It's really not that — that technical. 
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ARTICLE 2 
ORGANIZATION, AUTHORITY, DUTIES 
AND PROCEDURES 
Division I 
ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORITY 
Responsibility for Enforcement 
Sec. 2.101. The chief shall be responsible for the administration and enforce-
ment of this code. Under his direction, the fire department shall enforce all 
ordinances of the jurisdiction pertaining to: 
1. The prevention of fires. 
2. The suppression or extinguishing of dangerous or hazardous fires. 
3. The storage, use and handling of explosive, flammable, combustible, toxic, 
corrosive and other hazardous gaseous, solid and liquid materials. 
4. The installation and maintenance of automatic, manual and other private fire 
alarm systems and fire-extinguishing equipment. 
5. The maintenance and regulation of fire escapes. 
6. The maintenance of fire protection and the elimination of fire hazards on 
land and in buildings, structures and other property, including those under con-
struction. 
I 7. The maintenance of exits. 
8. The investigation of the cause, origin and circumstances of fire. 
Rules and Regulations 
Sec. 2.102. The chief, with the approval of the administrator, is authorized to 
make and enforce such rules and regulations for the prevention and control of fires 
and fire hazards as may be necessary from time to time to carry out the intent of 
| this code. A minimum of one certified copy or the number required by governing 
| law of such rules and regulations shall be filed with the clerk of the jurisdiction 
| and shall be in effect immediately thereafter and additional copies shall be kept in 
| the office of the fire department for distribution to the public. 
Fire Prevention Bureau 
Sec. 2.103. A fire prevention bureau is established within the fire department 
under the direction of the fire chief, which shall consist of such fire department 
personnel as may be assigned thereto by the fire chief. The function of this bureau 
shall be to assist the fire chief in the administration and enforcement of the fire 
prevention provisions of this code. 
Fire Prevention Engineer or Fire Marshal 
Sec. 2.104. The chief may designate a member of the fire department to 
exercise the powers and perform the duties of fire prevention engineer as set forth 
in this code. He may also be known as fire marshal. 
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ALTER AND ALTERATION is any change, addition or modification in 
construction or occupancy. 
APARTMENT HOUSE is any building, or portion thereof, which contains | 
three or more dwelling units and, for the purposes of the code, includes residential
 B 
condominiums. I 
APPROVED refers to approval by the chief as the result of investigation and 
tests conducted by him or by reason of accepted principles or tests by national 
authorities, technical or scientific organizations. 
AREA shall mean a particular extent of surface. (Also sec Floor Area.) 
ASPHALT KETTLE is any vessel or container used to process, heat, hold for 
heating or dispense flammable or combustible roofing materials that arc in liquid 
form or will take that form as a result of being exposed to such vessel or container. 
ASSEMBLY is the gathering together of 50 or more persons for such purposes « 
as deliberation, education, instruction, worship, entertainment, amusement, i 
drinking, dining or awaiting transportation. ' 
ATMOSPHERIC TANK is a storage tank which has been designed to operate 
at pressures from atmospheric through 0.5 psig. 
ATRIUM is an opening through two or more floor levels other than enclosed | 
stairways, elevators, hoistways, escalators, plumbing, electrical, air- B 
conditioning or other equipment, which is closed at the top and not defined as a | 
mall. Floor levels as used in this definition do not include balconies withing an B 
assembly occupancy or mezzanines which comply with the Building Code re- j 
quirements for mezzanines. B 
AUTOMATIC FIRE ALARM SYSTEM is a system which automatically 
detects a fire condition and actuates a fire alarm signal device. 
AUTOMATIC FIRE CHECK is a device listed for installation in communi-
cating piping carrying an explosive vapor/air mixture to prevent a flashback from 
reaching the underground tanks or equipment in the piping system. These devices 
shall be equipped with special elements for arresting the explosion wave which 
may be already established in a pipe. These devices shall contain an automatically 
operated shutoff valve to stop flow of vapor/air mixture in event of a flashback and 
continued burning at the arrester element. The shutoff valve shall be capable of a 
manual reset. 
AUTOMATIC FIRE-EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM is an approved system | 
of devices and equipment which automatically detects a fire and discharges an B 
approved fire-extinguishing agent onto or in the area of a fire. | 
B 
Sec. 9.104. BALCONY, EXTERIOR EXIT, is a landing or porch projecting | 
from the wall of a building and which serves as an exit. The long side shall be at B 
least 50 percent open, and the open area above the guardrail shall be so distributed i 
as to prevent the accumulation of smoke or toxic gases. ® 
BARREL shall mean a volume of 42 U.S. gallons. 
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(i) Bridges. When a bridge is required to be used as access under this section, it 
shall be constructed and maintained in accordance with the applicable sections of 
the Building Code and using designed live loading sufficient to carry the imposed 
loads of fire apparatus. 
(j) Grade. The gradient for a fire apparatus access road shall not exceed the 
maximum approved by the chief. 
0c) Obstruction. The required width of any fire apparatus access road shall not 
be obstructed in any manner, including parking of vehicles. Minimum required 
widths and clearances established under this section shall be maintained at all 
times. 
(I) Signs. When required, approved signs or other approved notices shall be 
provided and maintained for fire apparatus access roads to identify such roads and 
prohibit the obstruction thereof or both. 
Premises Identification 
Sec 10.208. (a) General. Approved numbers or addresses shall be placed on 
all new and existing buildings in such a position as to be plainly visible and legible 
from the street or road fronting the property. Said numbers shall contrast with their 
background. 
(b) Street or Road Signs. When required by the chief, a street or road shall be f 
identified with approved signs. | 
Key Box 
See. 10.209. When access to or within a structure or an area is unduly difficult 
because of secured openings or where immediate access is necessary for life-
saving or fire-fighting purposes, the chief may require a key box to be installed in 
an accessible location. The key box shall be a type approved by the chief and shall 
contain keys to gain necessary access as required by the chief. 
Division til 
INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE OF FIRE-
PROTECTION, LIFE-SAFETY SYSTEMS AND 
APPLIANCES 
Installation 
* Sec 10301. (a) Type Required. The chief shall designate the type and number 
of fire appliances to be installed and maintained in and upon all buildings and 
premises in the jurisdiction other than private dwellings. This shall be done 
according to the relative severity of probable fire, including the rapidity with 
which it may spread. Such appliances shall be of a type suitable for the probable 
class of fire associated with such building or premises and shall have approval of 
the chief. 
(b) Special Hazards. In occupancies of an especially hazardous nature or 
where special hazards exist in addition to the normal hazard of the occupancy, or 
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where access for fire apparatus is unduly difficult, additional safeguards may be 
required consisting of additional fire appliance units, more than one type of 
appliance, or special systems suitable for the protection of the hazard involved. 
Such devices or appliances may consist of automatic fire alarm systems, auto-
matic sprinkler or water spray systems, standpipe and hose, fixed or portable fire 
extinguishers, suitable asbestos blankets, breathing apparatus, manual or auto-
matic covers, carbon dioxide, foam, halogenated and dry chemical or other 
special fire-extinguishing systems. Where such systems are installed, they shall 
be in accordance with the applicable Uniform Fire Code Standards or standards of 
the National Fire Protection Association when Uniform Fire Code Standards do 
not apply. 
f (c) Water Supply. An approved water supply capable of supplying the required 
| fire flow for fire protection shall be provided to all premises upon which buildings 
| or portions of buildings are hereafter constructed. When any portion of ihe 
| building protected is in excess of 150 feet from a water supply on a public street, as 
I measured by an approved route around the exterior of the building/there shall be 
| provided, when required by the chief, on-site fire hydrants and mains capable of 
| supplying the required fire flow. 
i 
| Water supply may consist of reservoirs, pressure tanks, elevated tanks, w^ u 
| mains or other fixed systems capable of providing the required fire flow/In setting 
| the requirements for fire flow, the chief may be guided by the provision in 
| Appendix HI-A of this code. 
>The location, number and type of fire hydrants connected to a water supply 
capable of delivering the required fire flow shall be provided on the public street 
or on the site of the premises to be protected as required and approved by the chiefV 
All hydrants shall be accessible to the fire department apparatus by roadways 
meeting the requirements of Section 10.207. 
| (d) Fire Hydrant Markers. When required by the chief, hydrant locations 
f shall be identified by the installation of reflective markers. 
y(c) Timing of Installation. When fire protection facilities are to be installed by 
the developer, such facilities including all surface access roads shall be installed 
and made serviceable prior to and during the time of construction. When alternate 
methods of protection, as approved by the chief, are provided, the above may be 
modified or waived. « " * 
(0 Approval and Testing. All fire alarm systems, fire hydrant systems, fire-
extinguishing systems (including automatic sprinklers), wet and dry standpipes, 
basement inlet pipes, and other fire-protection systems and appurtenances thereto 
shall meet the approval of the fire department as to installation and location and 
shall be subject to such periodic tests as required by the chief. Plans and specifica-
tions shall be submitted to the fire department for review and approval prior to 
construction. 
Maintenance 
Sec. 10.302. (a) General. All sprinkler systems, fire hydrant systems, stand-
pipe systems, fire alarm systems, portable fire extinguishers, smoke and heat 
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| Division III 
| FIRE PROTECTION 
I APPENDIX IH-A 
J FIRE-FLOW REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS 
f 1. SCOPE 
I This appendix is the procedure for determining fire-flow requirments for all 
1 buildings or portions of buildings hereafter constructed. This appendix is not 
| intended to apply to structures other than buildings. The fire-flow requirement is 
| the quantity of water in gallons per minute needed to control an anticipated fire in 
| a building or group of buildings. The chief shall establish the minimum residual 
| pressure and the flow duration to be used when determining fire flow. 
f 2. DEFINITIONS 
| FIRE AREA is the total floor area in square feet for all floor levels within the 
| exterior walls, or under the horizontal projection of the roof of a building. Each 
| portion of a building separated by one or more four-hour area separation walls 
| with no openings and provided with a 30-inch parapet constructed in accordance 
| with the Building Code may be considered as separate fire areas for the purposes 
| of determining the required fire flow. 
| 3. MODIFICATIONS 
] Fire-flow requirements may be modified downward for isolated buildings or 
| group of buildings in rural areas or small communities where the development of 
| full fire-flow requirements is impractical. 
1 Fire flow may be modified upward where conditions indicate an unusual 
| susceptability to group fires or conflagrations. An upward modification shall not 
| be more than twice that required for the building under consideration. 
| 4. FIRE-FLOW REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS 
| The minimum fire-flow requirements for one- and two-family dwellings shall 
| be 1000 gallons per minute. 
§ EXCEPTION: Fire flow may be reduced 50 percent when the building is 
1 provided with an approved automatic sprinkler system. 
| The fire flow for buildings other than one- and two-family dwellings shall be 
| not less than that specified in Table No. HI-A-A. 
I EXCEPTION: The required fire flow may be reduced up to 75 percent when the 
I building is provided with an approved automatic sprinkler system, but in no case less 
| than 1500 gallons per minute. 
| In Types I and U-F.R. construction, only the three largest successive floor areas 
§ shall be used. 
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TABLE NO. Ill-A-A 
FIRE-FLOW GUIDE FOR BUILDINGS OTHER THAN 
ONE- AND TWO-FAMILY DWELLINGS 
FIRE 
FLOW 
(Gallons 
Per 
| Minute) 
1,500 
1,750 
2,000 
2,250 
2,500 
2,750 
3,000 
3,250 
3,500 
3,750 
4,000 
4,250 
4.500 
4,750 
5,000 
5,250 
5,500 
5.750 
6.000 
6,250 
6,500 
6,750 
7,000 
7,250 
7,500 
7,750 
8,000 
i 
ll-F.R. 
22,700 
30.200 
38,700 
48,300 
59,000 
70,900 
83,700 
97,700 
112,700 
128,700 
145,900 
164,200 
183,400 
203,700 
225,200 
247,700 
271,200 
295,900 
UNLIMITED 
". 
** 
" 
^ 
" 
CONSTRUCTION TYPE 
II ONE-HR. 
HI ONE-HR. 
tV-H.T. 
V-ONE-HR. 
H-N 
Hf-N 
TOTAL FIRE AREA IN SQUARE FEET 
12.700 
17.000 
2L800 
24.200 
33.200 
39,700 
47,100 
54.900 
63.400 
72.400 
82.100 
92,400 
103,100 
114.600 
126,700 
139.400 
152.600 
166.500 
UNLIMITED 
8.200 
10,900 
12,900 
17,400 
21,300 
25,500 
30,100 
35,200 
40,600 
46,400 
52,500 
59,100 
66,000 
73,300 
81,100 
89,200 
97,700 
106,500 
115,800 
125.500 
135,500 
145,800 
156,700 
167,900 
179,400 
191.400 
UNLIMITED 
5,900 
7,900 
9,800 
12,600 
15,400 
18.400 
21,800 
25,900 
29,300 
33,500 
37,900 
42,700 
47.700 
53,000 
58,600 
65,400 
70,600 
77,000 
83,700 
90,600 
97,900 
106,800 
113,200 
121,300 
129,600 
138,300 
UNLIMITED 
V-N J 
3,600 
4,800 
6,200 1 
7,700 
9,400 
11.300 
13,400 1 
15,600 j 
18,000 
20,600 
23,300 | 
26,300 | 
29,300 ! 
32,600 I 
36,000 
39,600 
43,400 | 
47,400 
51,500 | 
55,700 
60,200 j 
64,800 1 
69,600 
74,600 | 
79,800 
85,100 ! 
UNLIMITED ! 
APPENDIX IIJ-B UNIFORM FIRE CODE 
APPENDIX lll-B 
FIRE HYDRANT LOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION 
1. SCOPE 
Fire hydrants shall be provided for the protection of all buildings or portions of 
buildings hereafter constructed. Fire hydrants shall be provided along required 
fire apparatus access roadways and adjacent public streets. 
2. NUMBER OF HYDRANTS 
The minimum number of hydrants available to a building shall be not less than 
that listed in Table No. III-B-A. The number of hydrants available to a complex or 
subdivision shall not be less than that determined by spacing requirements listed 
on Table No. III-B-A when applied to fire apparatus access roadways and perime-
ter public streets from which fire operations may be conducted. 
Existing hydrants on public streets may be considered available unless fire 
apparatus access roadways extend between properties and easements are estab-
lished to prevent their obstruction. 
3. DISTRIBUTION OF HYDRANTS 
The average spacing between fire hydrants shall not exceed that listed on Table 
No. III-B-A, except mat the chief may accept a deficiency of up to 10 percent 
where existing hydrants provide all or a portion of the required fire hydrant 
service. 
Regardless of the average spacing, no point on the street or access roadway 
adjacent to a building shall be farther from a hydrant than that distance listed in the 
last column of Table No. III-B-A. 
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TABLE NO. IH-B-A 
NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF RRE HYDRANTS 
Fine FLOW 
REQUIREMENT 
750-1750 
2000-2250 
2500 
3000 
35GXMO00 
4500-5000 
5500 
6000 
6500-7000 
1 7500 or more 
MINIMUM 
NO. OF 
HYDRANTS 
1 
2 
3 
3 
4 
5 
6 
6 
7 
Sorroore4 
AVERAGE SPACING 
BETWEEN HYORANTS1 2 5 (ft) 
500 
450 
450 
400 
350 
300 
300 
250 
250 
200 
MAXIMUM DISTANCE FROM 
HYORANT TO ANY POINT ON 
STREET OR ROADWAY FRONTAGES 
(ft) 
250 
225 
225 
225 
210 
180 
180 
150 
150 
120 
'Reduce by 100 feet for dead-end streets or roadways. 
^Where streets are provided with median dividers which can be crossed by fire fighters 
pulling hose lines, or arterial streets are provided with four or more traffic lanes and have a 
traffic count of more than 30,000 vehicles per day, hydrant spacing shall average 500 feet 
on each side of the street and be arranged on an alternating basis up to a fire-flow 
requirement of 7000 gpm and 400 feet for higher fire-flow requirements. 
Reduce by 50 feet for dead-end streets or roadways. 
One hydrant for each 1000 gpm or fraction thereof. 
*Where new water mains are extended along streets where hydrants are not needed for 
protection of structures or similar fire problems, fire hydrants should be provided at not 
less than 1000-foot spacing to provide for transportation hazards. 
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